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The United States is known worldwide for its high quality, innovative goods and 
services,1 and several businesses regularly export its products to other countries.2  Although most 
products are not subject to export regulations, the government closely regulates several types of 
exports.3  Academic literature has persistent and extensive discussions about what exports should 
be regulated and what trade policies should govern such regulation.4  National security has long 
been a reason why exports are regulated.5  For example, defense-related exports, or so-called 
“dual-use” technologies—those that can be used in military and civil functions—have long been 
																																																								
1 Export Planning, INT’L TRADE ADMIN., http://apps.export.gov/article?id=why-export (last 
visited Aug. 2, 209) 
2 Id. 
3 Id. 
4 See, e.g., Robert E. Klitgaard & Richard Huff, Limiting Exports on National Security Grounds, 
4 COMM’N ON THE ORG. OF THE GOV’T FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POL’Y 441 app. at 443 
(1975) (“But critics of all stripes, as well as many officials now administering export controls, 
agree on one thing: current policy and procedures are in a shambles”);  see, e.g., Trey Herr & 
Paul Rosenzweig, Cyber Weapons and Export Control: Incorporating Dual Use with the PrEP 
Model, 8 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 301, 320 (2016) (contemplating when malware becomes a 
weapon of war). 
5 See Jere W. Morehead & David A. Dismuke, Export Control Policies and National Security: 
Protecting U.S. Interests in the New Millennium, 34 TEX. INT’L L. J. 173, 186 (1999) 
(“Controlling the export of such weapons and the technology to make them has been the 
cornerstone of U.S. policy since the conclusion of World War II”). 
	 2 
regulated by U.S. export controls.6  However, in an era where technology develops so rapidly 
beyond comprehension, and certainly beyond efficient regulation, emerging technologies have 
become a moving target. 
With China’s economic growth and Russia’s ever-looming threat, along with the recent 
history of technological attacks, bad actors are empowered to use new technologies against the 
U.S.  Legal literature has discussed “emerging technologies” as a topic for a significant time.7  
Articles often use the term to describe the concept that regulations should match the challenge of 
meeting technology development.8  Technology is evolving so fast that it is no longer possible 
for people to predict its future.9  In other words, technology will continue to develop at a fast 
pace, and its regulation needs to keep up. 
																																																								
6 See infra note 42. 
7 See, e.g., Gregory N. Mandel, Regulating Emerging Technologies, 1 LAW, INNOVATION & 
TECH. 75, 92 (2009). 
8 Id. 
9 Chris Gulker, Technology is moving so fast that we can no longer reliably predict the future 
even a few years ahead, INDEP. (March 10, 1998), https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-
entertainment/technology-is-moving-so-fast-that-we-can-no-longer-reliably-predict-the-future-
even-a-few-years-1149323.html.  It is a strange thought that this article was written before Apple 
introduced the first iPhone, which ushered a new era of mobile technology.  See Ben Gilbert, It’s 
been over 12 years since the iPhone debuted–look how primitive the first one seems today, BUS. 
INSIDER (July 22, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/first-phone-anniversary-2016-12 
(addressing how technology has developed since the first iPhone).  
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Emerging technologies are compromising our national security.  For example, Russia 
allegedly influenced the 2016 elections through Facebook’s data technology.10  China allegedly 
committed cyberattacks against universities to steal research on naval technologies.11  Criminals 
are committing local “ransomware” cyberattacks through Eternal Blue, a technology created by 
the National Security Agency.12  Compromises in national security due to the proliferation and 
malicious use of technologies have become a part of the regular news cycle.  On a large scale, 
people with malicious intent could use technology to crumble economic infrastructures, disrupt 
social communications, or attack with technologically advanced military weapons.13 
																																																								
10 Julia Kollewe, Facebook Profit Likely to Fall After Fake News Privacy Scandals, GUARDIAN 
(Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/apr/22/facebook-profit-fall-fake-
news-privacy-scandals. 
11 Shannon Liao, Chinese hackers reportedly targeted 27 universities for military secrets, VERGE 
(March 5, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/5/18251836/chinese-hackers-us servers-
universities-military-secrets-cybersecurity. 
12 Patricia Mezzei, Hit by Ransomware Attack, Florida City Agrees to Pay Hackers $600,000, 
N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/19/us/florida-riviera-beach-
hacking-ransom.html;  Nicole Perlroth & Scott Shane, In Baltimore and Beyond, a Stolen N.S.A. 
Tool Wreaks Havoc, N.Y. TIMES (May 25, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/25/us/nsa-
hacking-tool-baltimore.html?module=inline. 
13 See, e.g., Michael Griffin, The Dangers of Modern Technology, ODYSSEY (Aug. 18, 2015), 
https://www.theodysseyonline.com/the-danger-in-modern-technology (commenting on the 
dangers of technology in context of cyberattacks);  see also, Max Boot, The Paradox of Military 
	 4 
Oracle Corporation is a prominent provider of business software that has a significant 
role in the development of emerging technologies.14  Edward Screven, Chief Corporate Architect 
of Oracle Corporation, noted the perils of working with data, “[W]e manage important data—
critical data—for tens of thousands of customers today in our data centers across the world. And 
of course, there are a lot of bad actors out there, who would like to get to it, either to get the data, 
or worse, try to change it.”15  Similar to the national security concern that cloud data centers 
pose, other technologies, such as artificial intelligence, DNA manipulation, and 5G technology, 
have critical security implications.  But since regulation cannot simply stop innovation and the 
development of technologies, identifying emerging technologies in a way that allows for 
efficient regulation is a critical challenge.  It is also difficult to clarify what dangers emerging 
technologies could realistically have to national security. 
 Recently, in the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2019,16 Congress called upon the President and the heads of his agencies to establish a process in 
which the heads of agencies conduct a regular, ongoing, process to identify “emerging and 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Technology, NEW ATLANTIS J. OF TECH. & SOC’Y 13, 13–26 (2006), 
https://www.thenewatlantis.com/docLib/TNA14-Boot.pdf 
 (commenting on the U.S. dominance over various military technologies).  
14 Oracle Fact Sheet, ORACLE (2019), http://www.oracle.com/us/corporate/oracle-fact-sheet-
079219.pdf. 
15Emerging Technology Trends & National Security, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (March 
25, 2019), https://www.csis.org/events/emerging-technology-trends-and-national-security. 
16 50 U.S.C. § 4817 (2019). 
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foundational technologies”17 that “are essential to the national security of the United States.”18  
The Act failed to define what national security is in this context.  However, it described what the 
interagency process should take into account:19 the development of emerging technologies in 
foreign countries, the effect of export controls on developing emerging technologies in the 
United States, and the effectiveness of export controls in limiting the proliferation of emerging 
technologies to foreign countries.20 
 In addition to these guidelines, the Act required a notice and comment period.21  The 
Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) initiated an advance notice of 
proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) seeking public comment on defining and recognizing emerging 




19 50 U.S.C. § 4817 (a)(2)(B). 
20 Id. 
21 50 U.S.C. § 4817 (a)(2)(C). 
22 This comment period does not include identification of “foundational technologies,” for which 
a separate advance notice of proposed rulemaking (ANPRM) will take place.  See Review of 
Controls for Certain Emerging Technologies, 83 Fed. Reg. 58,201 (Nov. 19, 2018) (to be 
codified at 15 C.F.R. § 744) (2018) (designating seven areas that comments should focus on:  
“(1) How to define emerging technology to assist identification of such technology in the future;  
(2) criteria to apply to determine whether there are specific technologies within these general 
categories that are important to U.S. national security;  (3) sources to identify such technologies;  
(4) other general technology categories that warrant review to identify emerging technology that 
	 6 
emerging technologies is to make the export of such technologies subject to the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR) by placing that product on the Commerce Control List 
(CCL).23  The ANPRM suggested fourteen broad categories to help identify emerging 
technologies.24  Through this ANPRM the BIS seeks to add technologies to this list, and place 
export controls on them.25  Currently, exports are controlled via the CCL, through which the 
EAR, as a minimum control, issues licenses to exporters that want to ship an item on the CCL.26  
The BIS seeks to add newly identified emerging technologies to the list, and impose, at a 
minimum, a license control to the items on the CCL.27 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
are important to U.S. national security;  (5) the status of development of these technologies in the 
United States and other countries;  (6) the impact specific emerging technology controls would 
have on U.S. technological leadership;  (7) any other approaches to the issue of identifying 
emerging technologies important to U.S. national security, including the stage of development or 
maturity level of an emerging technology that would warrant consideration for export control.”  
23 See id;  15 C.F.R. §734 (2017). 
24 15 C.F.R. § 744 (2018). The broad categories listed are biotechnology;  artificial intelligence 
and machine learning technology;  position, navigation, and timing technology;  microprocessor 
technology;  advanced computing technology;  data analytics technology;  quantum information 
and sensing technology;  logistics technology;  additive manufacturing;  robotics;  brain-
computer interfaces;  hypersonics;  advanced materials;  and advanced surveillance technologies. 
25 The ANPRM has now ended.  Businesses and practitioners are still waiting for the Commerce 
Department to publish new rules. 
26 See infra PART TWO. 
27 See 15 C.F.R. §744 (2018). 
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 Regardless of what rules the BIS adopt, the scope of national security seems ill defined 
and unclear.28  The BIS needs to publish additional guidance describing when national security is 
implicated, with examples or realistic illustrations of national security being compromised that 
could be effectively avoided through export regulations.  Also, the technological and business 
expertise of those who are attempting to adopt these regulations may be inadequate.29  There is a 
fundamental disparity between the knowledge and expertise of the government and private 
corporations.30  This process of adopting export regulations may hinder U.S. innovation and 
market interests because of its broad designations that may require a lengthy licensing process.  
Additionally, the process may also be too slow to react effectively and efficiently to technology’s 
																																																								
28 See Jay Stanley, How to Think About the National Security State, ACLU: FREE FUTURE (Sept. 
5, 2013, 11:00 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-security/secrecy/how-think-about-
national-security-state?redirect=blog/technology-and-liberty-national-security-criminal-law-
reform/how-think-about-national-security (exploring why it is important to clearly understand 
national security, suggesting that it enables people to keep the leaders in check);  see also, Jay 
Stanley, The National Security State: Why it’s Important to Understand the Nature of the Beast, 
ACLU: FREE FUTURE (Sept. 10, 2013, 3:48 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/national-
security/secrecy/national-security-state-why-its-important-understand-nature-
beast?redirect=blog/criminal-law-reform-national-security-technology-and-liberty/national-
security-state-why-its (commenting that there is a wall of secrecy behind which national security 
agencies operate). 
29 See generally, Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power Meets Bureaucratic Expertise, 12 U. PA. J. 
CONST. L. 461 (2010) (discussing the role of expertise in bureaucracy). 
30 Id. 
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rapid development because it may always involve a reevaluation of new technologies through a 
comment period such as this one. 
 Part One of this Comment explains the definition of exports and the multiple agencies 
that have regulations for exports; Part One also discusses the role of the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) in export controls.  Part Two explains the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR), its process of exports regulation, and the types of products it 
currently controls.  Part Three discusses the BIS’s ANPRM on emerging technologies, including 
a brief discussion of comments made to the ANPRM.  Part Four recommends a new rulemaking 
period to define the policy of national security to supplement identifying emerging technologies.  
Part Four also recommends creating a separate committee or agency to consolidate efforts in 
identifying emerging technologies. 
PART ONE: EXPLAINING EXPORTS 
A. Defining Exports 
The EAR has defined exports on multiple facets.31  Included in the meaning of an export 
is taking the item out of the country in any manner,32 and transferring “technology” or source 
code to a foreign person in the United States is called a “deemed export.”33  Often situations arise 
where an item subject to the EAR is transferred from one foreign country to another foreign 
country.34  Such a transfer is called a “reexport.”35  Release of “technology” to a foreign person 
																																																								
31 15 C.F.R. §§ 734.13–734.18 (2017). 
32 Id. at 734.13(a)(1). 
33 Id. at 734.13(a)(2). 
34 Id. at 734.14(a)(1). 
35 Id.  
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of another country is a “deemed reexport” to the foreign person’s most recent country of 
citizenship or permanent residency.36  When businesses want to export its products, they must 
first identify which agency’s jurisdiction the product falls under.  Then, the business must 
identify what classification of exports the product is subject to.37 
B. Jurisdiction: Agencies that Control Exports 
There are about sixteen agencies that have functions related to exports.38  Three 
departments have broad jurisdiction over exports: the Department of State, the Department of 
Treasury, and the Department of Commerce:39  The State Department has jurisdiction over 
defense related exports;40  The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) 
regulates transactions in administering U.S. economic sanctions.41  The Commerce Department 
has jurisdiction over “dual-use” exports,42 and other exports not identified by other agencies.43 
																																																								
36 Id. at 734.14(a)(2).  The EAR also defines other classifications that are similar to exports.  See 
id. at 734.13–734.20 (defining release, transfer, export of encryption source code and object code 
software, etc.). 
37 See infra PART TWO (C). 
38 JOHN R. LIEBMAN, ROSZEL C. THOMSEN II, JAMES E. BARTLETT III & JOHN C. PISA-RELLI, 
UNITED STATES EXPORT CONTROLS §1.00 (7th ed. 2018). 
39 Id. at §1.01. 
40 Stanley J. Marcuss & Michael B. Zara, A Better Way through the Export Control Thicket, 
14 SANTA CLARA J. INT’L L. 47, 48 (2016). 
41 Id. 
42 See 15 C.F.R. § 730.3 (2014) (defining dual-use exports as any item that has “civil 
applications as well as terrorism and military or weapons of mass destruction . . . applications.”) 
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Although the agency’s jurisdiction over an export often overlaps,44 for certain “category-
specific” items, one of these three agencies controls its export.45  Other agencies have 
jurisdiction over specific exports. Some agencies, such as the Defense Technology Security 
Administration, Export-Import Bank, International Trade Administration, and U.S. Agency for 
International Development, provide advisory roles or policy-making roles over exports.46  
However, these agencies cannot regulate exports.47  Other agencies, such as Customs and Border 
Protection and the Postal Service, serve administrative functions.48  
Because so many agencies have overlapping jurisdiction, exporters have been 
consistently lobbying for the consolidation of these agencies.49  Exporters, nonproliferation 
advocates, allies, and other stakeholders have criticized aspects of the export control system for 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
43 Marcuss, supra note 40, at 49 (2016) (describing the jurisdiction of various export control 
agencies);  See 15 C.F.R. §§ 772.1, 734.2(a) (2014) (“Exports under the Wassenaar Arrangement 
Munitions List (WAML) or the Missile Technology Control Regime Annex are also subject to 
the EAR”).  The WAML is an international agreement through which participating States apply 
export controls to items set on an agreed upon “Dual-Use Goods and Technologies and 
Munitions” list. WASSENAAR ARRANGEMENT, https://www.wassenaar.org/ (last visited Sept. 20, 
2019). 







being too “rigorous, cumbersome, obsolete,” and inefficient.50  Administrations have considered 
consolidation proposals, but no complete consolidation has happened.51  The Obama 
Administration attempted to create a single licensing agency and merge the control lists to 
harmonize export control enforcement agencies, recognizing the inefficiency of the export 
controls system.52  Currently, the Trump Administration is not pursuing agency restructuring in 
the same way the Obama Administration did, but is directing trade and export policies, especially 
with President Trump’s stance on trade with China.53 
																																																								
50 Ian F. Fergusson & Paul K. Kerr, The U.S. Export control System and the Export Control 
Reform Initiative, CONG. RES. SERV. 1, 1 (April 5, 2019), 
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R41916.pdf. 
51 See, e.g., Fact Sheet: Implementation of Export Control Reform, THE WHITE HOUSE (March 
08, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/03/08/fact-sheet-
implementation-export-control-reform (describing an initiative that is indicative of President 
Obama’s export consolidation efforts). 
52 Fergusson, supra note 50, at 9–11. 
53See Anna Fifield & David J. Lynch, China warns of ‘countermeasures’ against U.S. products if 
Trump increases tariff, WASH. POST (May 8, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/china-warns-of-countermeasures-on-us-
products-if-trump-boosts-tariffs/2019/05/08/f45c6cb6-718e-11e9-9331-
30bc5836f48e_story.html?utm_term=.b2e9aaf109c3;  but see Control of Firearms, Guns, 
Ammunition and Related Articles the President Determines No Longer Warrant Control Under 
the United States Munitions List (USML), 83 Fed. Reg. 24,166 (May 24, 2018) (to be codified at 
	 12 
C.       The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) 
When mentioning the current status of exports regulation in the United States, a 
discussion of CFIUS is inevitable because it has a prominent role in controlling emerging 
technologies, but in a different manner.54  Along with the jurisdictions of other export controlling 
agencies, the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA) gave CFIUS 
expanded authority to analyze and monitor an extensive range of transactions by foreign 
investors in United States companies.55   
 CFIUS was originally established by President Ford’s Executive Order56 in 1975 to 
monitor the rapid increase of foreign investment by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC) in American assets, specifically responding to concerns that OPEC’s interests 
were not economic, but political.57  After the enactment of FIRRMA,58 the president is allowed 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
15 C.F.R. pt. 736, 740, 742, 743, 744, 746, 748, 758, 762, 772, 774) (consolidating exports 
controlled under the USML with the Commerce Control List, an export reform effort). 
54 The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), DEPT. OF THE TREAS., 
https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-on-foreign-investment-in-
the-united-states-cfius (last visited on Sept. 20, 2019). 
55 Harry Clark, Ten Key Points About CFIUS and Export Control Reform, ORRICK: INSIGHTS 
(Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.orrick.com/Insights/2018/08/Ten-Key-Points-About-CFIUS-and-
Export-Control-Reform. 
56 Exec. Order No. 11,858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (May 7, 1975). 
57 James K. Jackson, The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS), CONG. 
RES. SERV. 1, 4–5 (May 15, 2019), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33388.pdf. 
58 50 U.S.C. § 4565 (2019). 
	 13 
to suspend or block any proposed or pending foreign “mergers, acquisitions, or takeovers” that 
could result in foreign control of a United States business that would threaten to impair national 
security.59 
 In November, 2018, CFIUS adopted an interim pilot program that expanded CFIUS’s 
scope and made effective mandatory declarations.60  Businesses that fall under the scope of 
CFIUS have to file a declaration to CFIUS if a foreign transaction is expected.61  
 In 2016, China invested $18.7 billion in 107 U.S. tech firms.62  In April 2019, CFIUS 
demanded that Chinese owners of Grindr,63 a dating app geared toward LGBTQ+ community 
members, give up control of the company after the Chinese owners had strategically bought out 
the American company.64  Since Grindr keeps a lot of user data and tracks its user’s movements, 
many U.S. officials and government contractors’ identities could be compromised.65  CFIUS’s 
decision to stop this transaction demonstrates that CFIUS is expanding its view of national 
																																																								
59 Jackson, supra note 57, at 7. 
60 Fact Sheet: Interim Regulations for FIRRMA Pilot Program, DEPT. OF TREAS. (Oct. 10, 2018), 
https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/206/Fact-Sheet-FIRRMA-Pilot-Program.pdf. 
61 Id. 
62 Sarah Bauerle Danzman & Geoffrey Gertz, Why is the U.S. forcing a Chinese company to sell 
the gay dating app Grindr?, WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/03/why-is-us-is-forcing-chinese-company-
sell-gay-dating-app-grindr/?utm_term=.2f816bf80702. 
63 GRINDR, https://www.grindr.com/ (last visited Aug. 16, 2019). 
64 Danzman, supra note 62. 
65 Id. 
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security.66  Since 2018, after CFIUS scrutiny increased, Chinese investments decreased to $2.2 
billion for 80 deals.67  The question remains whether a blanket limit on Chinese investments is a 
national security interest or harmful to the U.S. economy. 
 The interplay between export control and CFIUS is significant because it increases the 
opportunities for regulation of emerging technologies in the interest of national security.  
However, even under CFIUS, the specified goals of national security are elusive.  Importantly, 
FIRRMA, which bolstered and expanded CFIUS’s jurisdiction and functions, and the legislation 
requiring an ANPRM for emerging and foundational technologies were published in the same 
statute, the National Defense Authorization Act.68  This statute widely concerns for national 
security in a time where technology is rapidly developing.  Additionally, identifying “emerging 
technologies” under the recent ANPRM will become the “critical technologies” for CFIUS 
purposes.69  Meaning, using the term critical technologies in lieu of emerging technologies, 
CFIUS will also regulate investments in technologies that this ANPRM finds necessary to 
regulate.  Therefore, the current ANPRM for identifying emerging technologies has a huge 




68 50 U.S.C. §§ 4565, 4817. 
69 Kay C. Georgi & Marwa M. Hassoun, Action Alert: BIS Publishes List of Emerging 
Technologies That It Is Considering Subjecting to Unilateral US Export Control. Your Company 




PART TWO: EXPLAINING THE EAR 
A. What is the Export Administration Regulations (EAR)? 
The Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) regulates the 
export of certain commercial products and technologies under the EAR.70  Specifically, a small 
percentage of exports and reexports require a license.71  Exports that are regulated are listed in 
mainly two ways: through the Commerce Control List (CCL) and through the Entity List, which 
details the prohibition or restriction of commerce to certain countries and end users.72  The 
difference between these two ways is that through the CCL, the EAR regulates specific 
categories of products that require a license for its export.73  Through the Entity List, the EAR 
regulates specific “Persons and Entities” from participating in commerce.74  The Entity List 
includes details of countries and end-users that have embargoes and foreign trade policy 
restrictions.75   
B. EAR Controls 
The EAR specifies five facts that determine what obligations apply under the EAR: 1) 
																																																								
70 Overview of U.S. Export Laws, U. OF KAN., https://export-compliance.ku.edu/overview-us-
export-laws (last visited Aug. 2, 2019). 
71 15 C.F.R. §730.7 (2017). 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at §774 (2018). 
74 Id. at Supp. 4 to §744 (2019). 
75 Id. 
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“What is it?”76  This entails the classification of the item and whether it is placed on the CCL.  If 
the item is on the CCL, then it may require a license.77  2) “Where is it going?”78  The ultimate 
country of destination for an export or reexport may also determine whether a license is required 
for export.79  3) “Who will receive it?”80  This requirement clarifies the “end-user” of the item.81  
Some types of end-users cannot receive exports.82  4) “What will they do with it?”83  This 
question asks what the “end-use” of the item will be.84  Exports cannot be sent for certain end-
uses.85  And 5) “What else do they do?”86  Certain types of conduct, such as “contracting, 
financing, and freight forwarding” in support of a “proliferation project” may prevent the export 
																																																								












to someone.87  Additionally, an exporter must check to see if the item requires a license under 
one of ten general prohibitions subject to the EAR.88 
C. Types of Products Currently Controlled 
The EAR’s broad categorization of exports reflects its mindfulness of national security 
concerns.  Generally, types of exports are controlled under the CCL, which is divided into ten 
categories: “0-Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Equipment and Miscellaneous; 1-Materials, 
Chemicals, ‘Microorganisms,’ and Toxins; 2-Materials Processing; 3-Electronics; 4-Computers; 
5-Telecommunications and Information Security; 6-Lasers and Sensors; 7-Navigation and 
Avionics; 8-Marine; 9-Aerospace and Propulsion.”89  These categories are further divided and 
arranged by groups: “A: Equipment, Assemblies and Components; B-Test, Inspection and 
Production Equipment; C-Materials; D-Software; E-Technology.”90  What is important about 
these categories is realizing the EAR’s vague categorizations.  Many of these categories may 
even already cover emerging technologies in some way, thereby further highlighting existing 
inefficiencies in regulations.91  Additionally, technologies under one category may possibly fall 
																																																								
87 Id. 
88 See id. at §732.1(d) (listing a brief description of the ten general prohibitions, inter alia, the 
exports or reexports of controlled items to listed countries;  exports and reexports from abroad of 
the foreign-produced direct product of U.S. technology and software;  export or reexport to 
prohibited end-users and end-uses;  export or reexport to embargoed destinations). 
89 Id. at §738.2(a) (2018). 
90 Id. at §738.2(b) (2018). 
91 See id. 
	 18 
under another category.92  Given these existing categorizations, it is difficult to imagine how 
emerging technologies would be separately categorized. 
 The CCL also provides a designated acronym that identifies a “Reason for Control.”93  
Although a control can designate more than one reason, it seems as though “National Security” 
as a reason is a “catch-all” category.94  In the context of identifying emerging technologies, the 
question is whether the “interest of national security” will be the same reasons already outlined 
in the CCL?95   
 D. The Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) 
																																																								
92 See id. 
93 See id. at §738.2 (d)(2)(ii)(A) (listing fourteen different reasons that exports can be controlled 
and its acronym.  AT: Anti-terrorism;  CB: Chemical & Biological Weapons;  CC: Crime 
Control;  CW: Chemical Weapons Convention;  EI: Encryption Items;  FC: Firearms 
Convention;  MT: Missile Technology;  NS: National Security;  NP: Nuclear Nonproliferation; 
RS: Regional Stability;  SS: Short Supply;  UN: United Nations Embargo;  SI: Significant Items; 
SL: Surreptitious Listening). Several of these specifications seem to objectively imply a national 
security issue, such as anti-terrorism.  However, the inclusion of national security seems vague, 
compared to most of the other specifications.  
94 Cf. id. (listing fourteen specific categories, of which National Security is not necessarily the 
most specific); see supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
95 See 15 C.F.R. §742.4 (2018) (“It is the policy of the United States to restrict the export and 
reexport of items that would make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other 
country or combination of countries that would prove detrimental to the national security of the 
United States”). 
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Businesses have the opportunity to request classifications from the BIS and obtain 
licenses for exports.96  In the request, the business describes the product that it wishes to export, 
according to the form requirements, and submits that form to the BIS.97  The BIS then provides 
an Export Control Classification Number (ECCN) if applicable.98  The ECCN specifies the type 
of export.99  Each ECCN is either in the CCL, Supplement No. 1 to Part 774 of the EAR, and if 
not described by an ECCN, then it is an EAR99 item.100  Depending on the ECCN, certain 
exports to CCL-specified countries and end-users are controlled, which means a license could be 
required if a business wants to export a product with an ECCN that falls under the CCL.101  This 
classification process is supposed to be a streamlined way for businesses to obtain licenses from 
the BIS.   
 Depending on the ECCN, exceptions to getting licenses may also apply.102  Exports 
outlined in the License Exception ENC,103 do not require businesses to obtain a license.  
However, certain encryption technologies or digital forensics require annual or semi-annual 
																																																								
96 15 C.F.R. §748.1 (2017). 





102 Id. at §740.17 (2019). 
103 Id. 
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reports.104  This is a creative way for the BIS to garner information on technologies that could be 
used to help form and administer national security policies. 
E. EAR Violations 
The EAR provides detailed specifications of the types of violations and sanctions 
under the EAR.105  Although violations of the EAR seldom go to court, some cases have 
managed to make it through.  A thorough analysis of EAR violations and court opinions is 
outside the scope of this Comment.  However, to illustrate what EAR violations look like in the 
judicial process, the following is a brief mention of three cases: In United States v. Ihsan 
Elashyi,106 the defendants shipped exports to Libya through Malta.  They were charged under the 
Export Administration Act (EAA), which authorized the “Secretary of Commerce to issue 
regulations prohibiting or curtailing exports in order to protect or further the national security, 
foreign policy, or short-supply interests of the United States.”107  In United States v. Zhen Zhou 
Wu,108 the defendant exported electronic converters controlled under the CCL to China.109  In 
United States v. Geisser,110 the defendant exported F-14 aircraft tires to Iran.111  Interestingly, the 
																																																								
104 Id. 
105 Id. at §764.2 (2013). 
106 554 F.3d 480, 489 (5th Cir. 2008). 
107 Id. at 492. 
108 711 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2013). 
109 Id. at 21–25.  
110 731 F. Supp. 93, 94–96 (E.D.N.Y. 1990). 
111 Id. at 96. 
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court in this situation decided whether the classification of an ECCN covered the commodity 
being exported.112  
However, most violations do not reach court.  When serious violations occur, the BIS can 
take measures to include a violating business onto an export controlled Entity List.113  For 
example, in March 2016, the BIS placed ZTE Corp., a prominent Chinese technology 
corporation, on its Entity List—barring U.S. exporters from selling to the company.114  ZTE 
violated sanctions on Iran.115  The BIS imposed a penalty of $1.1 billion dollars in 2017 before 
removing ZTE from the entity list.116  ZTE then violated the settlement terms, received a full 
export ban, and racked up an additional $1.4 billion penalty.117   
1) 5G and Huawei 
Recently, news headlines have featured the Trump Administration’s ban on Huawei.118   
																																																								
112 Id. at 96–97. 
113 See supra PART TWO (A). 






118 See, e.g., Jeanne Whalen, Reed Albergotti & David J. Lynch, U.S. tech firms push Trump to 
allow sales to Huawei, set up White House meeting next week, WASH. POST (July 19, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/07/19/us-tech-companies-push-trump-allow-
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In January, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) placed Huawei Technologies Ltd., which 
is the biggest maker of network equipment for phone companies, on its entity list.119  American 
officials accused Huawei of facilitating Chinese spying, an allegation Huawei has denied.120  
Huawei is one of the biggest buyers of U.S. suppliers of chips and other technologies.121  The 
White House issued a temporary reprieve, allowing sales with Huawei to continue for 90 days; 
that period has expired.122  President Trump’s decision to ban Huawei sparked national security 
debates.123  
																																																																																																																																																																																		
some-sales-huawei/?utm_term=.9f355286e0d8 (reporting U.S. tech companies attempts to 
receive licenses to deal with Huawei);  see also 15 C.F.R. § 744 (2019). 
119 Dake Kang, Huawei calls on US to lift export restrictions, WASH. POST (July 12, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/newssearch/?datefilter=All%20Since%202005&query=huawei
&sort=Relevance&utm_term=.677048c37472. 
120 Maggie Millier, Blackburn says China building ‘spy network’ through Huawei technology, 
THE HILL (July 8, 2019), https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/452060-blackburn-says-china-
building-spy-network-through-huawei-technology;  Kang, supra note 119. 
121 Kang, supra note 119. 
122 Jeanne Whalen, Reed Albergotti & David J. Lynch, U.S. tech firms push Trump to allow sales 
to Huawei, set up White House meeting next week, WASH. POST (July 19, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/07/19/us-tech-companies-push-trump-allow-
some-sales-huawei/?utm_term=.9f355286e0d8. 
123 See Sean Kean, Huawei ban: Full timeline on how and why its phones are under fire, CNET 
(Aug. 16, 2019 3:05 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/huawei-ban-full-timeline-on-how-and-
why-its-phones-are-under-fire/ (presenting a timeline of President Trump’s Huawei ban); 
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 This ban, which is seemingly in the interest of national security, has profound economic 
interests as well.124  Despite Huawei allegedly dealing with Iran,125 facilitating spying for 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
Compare Reed Albergotti, Huawei ban threatens U.S. national security, tech companies warn 
Trump administration, WASH. POST (June 7, 2019), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/06/07/huawei-ban-threatens-us-national-
security-tech-companies-warn-trump-administration/ (reporting that U.S. technology companies 
informed the Commerce Department that the Huawei ban could severely damage the ability to 
develop “new technological innovations, including those needed by the U.S. military”), and 
Bloomberg, Google warns Washington that Huawei trade ban risks compromising US security: 
report, S. CHINA MORNING POST (June 7, 2019, 6:55 PM), 
https://www.scmp.com/tech/gear/article/3013599/google-warns-washington-huawei-trade-ban-
risks-compromising-us-security (reporting that Google warned Washington that Huawei could 
make its own modified version of Android software because Google cannot update the Android 
operating system on Huawei smartphones, making the technology vulnerable to hacking risks), 
with Simon Jenkins, Google’s Huawei ban is good news: tech giants shouldn’t always get their 
way, GUARDIAN (May 20, 2019), 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2019/may/20/google-huawei-ban-tech-giants-
donald-trump-blacklist (insisting that President Trump’s actions against Huawei, a company that 
has too eagerly dominated 5G technology, will have good consequences and is in the interests of 
openness and freedom.  “The last weapon against them may be the most cynical: national 
security, a stock excuse for bogus authoritarianism.  But any reason is better than nothing”). 
124 See Craig Timberg & Reed Albergotti, Will U.S. war on Huawei help China end its 
dependency on Western tech?, WASH. POST (May 24, 2019), 
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China,126 and having secret operations to build North Korea’s wireless network,127 Huawei is the 
leading company in the development of 5G technology.128  Banning Huawei effectively put a 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2019/05/24/tiny-technology-has-giant-
consequences-us-china-trade-war/ (“The U.S. move, based on national security concerns, could 
have long-term consequences that would not be in U.S. interests, spurring the creation of new 
competitors in an industry now dominated by Western companies such as Qualcomm, Intel, Arm 
and others”). 
125 Kenneth Rapoza, Further Investigations Show Ties of China’s Huawei To Iran, FORBES (Jan. 
8 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kenrapoza/2019/01/08/further-investigations-show-
chinas-huawei-broke-iran-sanctions/#2cf969783d6d. 
126 Maggie Millier, Blackburn says China building ‘spy network’ through Huawei technology, 
THE HILL (July 8, 2019), https://thehill.com/policy/cybersecurity/452060-blackburn-says-china-
building-spy-network-through-huawei-technology. 
127 Ellen Nakashima, Gerry Shih & John Hudson, Leaked documents reveal Huawei’s secret 








significant stop to its capability of releasing its 5G technology.129  On April 12, 2019, about a 
month before an Executive Order banned Huawei, President Trump said, “The race to 5G is on 
and America must win.”130  Huawei’s addition to the entity list in the interest of national 
security, along with President Trump’s public statements about winning the race to 5G, is an 
example of a national security interest that is blurred by an economic impetus. 
PART THREE: THE BIS’s ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 
A. Defining Emerging Technologies 
The descriptions of products on the Commerce Control List’s (CCL), and the process of 
obtaining an ECCN reflect the United States’ interest in protecting national security.131  The 
different categories within the CCL also reflect the Export Administration Regulation’s (EAR) 
attempt to keep up with technology.132  It is important to recognize the interplay between the 
																																																								
129 Todd Haselton, President Trump announces new 5G initiatives: It’s a race ‘America must 





131 15 C.F.R. §748 (2017);  see also supra note 22. 
132 See Daniele Rotolo, Diania Hicks & Ben Martin, What is an Emerging Technology?, SCI. 
POL’Y RES. UNIT (July, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2743186 
(discussing the difficulty of defining an emerging technology. “Yet, as an area of study, 
emerging technologies lacks key foundational elements, namely a consensus on what classifies a 
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CCL’s current broad categories, and this ANPRM’s even broader categorization.133  The 
ANPRM’s approach to simply name broad classifications of technologies, such as artificial 
intelligence or data analytics technology, may be so broad as to be a hindrance to innovation.134  
The Act lacks a narrowly tailored approach, along with specified applications of technology that 
pose a risk to national security.135   
The National Defense Authorization Act’s call upon the agencies to create an interagency 
process for identifying emerging technologies to update the CCL in the interest of national 
security is not a surprise, but a continued effort in bolstering U.S. national security.136  The 
portion within the National Defense Authorization Act that addresses the identification of 
emerging technologies is commonly called the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA), a statute 
that allows the regulation of emerging technologies.137  Along with ECRA, the Foreign 
Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA)—which gave the Committee on Foreign 
Investment in the United States (CFIUS) an even more significant role138—was also passed as 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
technology as ‘emergent’ and strong research designs that operationalize central theoretical 
concepts”).  
133 See supra PART TWO (C). 
134 See supra note 24. 
135 15 C.F.R. §744. 
136 50 U.S.C. § 4817 (2019). 
137 50 U.S.C. §§ 4801–4852 (2018). 
138 See supra PART ONE (C). 
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part of the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act.139  To reiterate, both ECRA and FIRRMA 
were passed in the National Defense Authorization Act.140 
B. Comments submitted to the ANPRM 
In response to the ANPRM, businesses and tech companies have made submitted 
comments public.  Businesses have detailed various concerns and suggestions surrounding the 
identification of emerging technologies.141  These comments contain many overlapping ideas 
regarding how to identify and regulate emerging technologies.  Analyzing these comments 
provides a business perspective on the problem of identifying emerging technologies.  Although 
a thorough analysis of these public comments is outside the scope of this Comment, it is 
particularly valuable to highlight and entertain some of the comments’ considerations.   
The Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) expressed concern that export controls 
should not impede or undermine the U.S. innovation and technology base.142  SIA asserts that 
																																																								
139 See supra PART ONE (C);  see also The Export Control Reform Act and Possible New 
Controls on Emerging and Foundational Technologies, AKIN GUMP: INSIGHTS (Sept. 12, 2018) 
https://www.akingump.com/en/news-insights/the-export-control-reform-act-of-2018-and-
possible-new-controls.html. 
140 50 U.S.C. § 4817 (2019). 
141 See, e.g., infra note 142. 
142 Comments of the Semiconductor Industry Association on Advanced Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking regarding Review of Controls for Certain Emerging Technologies, SIA (Jan. 10, 
2019), https://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/BIS-ANPRM-on-
emerging-technology-jan-10.pdf.  The Semiconductor Industry Association (SIA) is a trade 
association representing the semiconductor industry in the United States.  The global market is 
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maintaining a strong “semiconductor research, design, manufacturing and supplier base is, in 
itself, a national security issue . . .”143 Additionally, SIA emphasizes that proposed rules should 
be in accordance with the standards already set forth in ECRA, which states that unilateral 
controls should be rare and be used as a response to specific emergency situations essential to 
our national security.144 
Business Roundtable’s comment addresses the ANPRM with particular attention to 
ECRA’s policy statement, focusing on four primary goals:145 to adopt narrow a approach, to 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
concentrated in a few major countries;  the U.S. holds 50 percent of the global market share.  See 
id. 
143 Id.;  see also COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
ENSURING LONG-TERM U.S. LEADERSHIP IN SEMICONDUCTORS (Jan. 2017),  
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_ensuring_
long-term_us_leadership_in_semiconductors.pdf (“Cutting-edge semiconductor technology is 
also critical to defense systems and U.S. military strength, and the pervasiveness of 
semiconductors makes their integrity important to mitigating cybersecurity risk”). 
144 SIA supra note 142. 
145 Business Roundtable Comments on the Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) 
regarding the Review of Controls for Certain Emerging Technologies, BUS. ROUNDTABLE (Jan. 
12 2019), https://www.businessroundtable.org/business-roundtable-comments-on-the-advance-
notice-of-proposed-rulemaking-anprm-regarding-the-review-of-controls-for-certain-emerging-
technologies.  The Business Roundtable is an association of chief executive officers.  The 
members of the Business Roundtable together employ more than 15 million people and have 
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avoid unilateral controls, to coordinate with “allies and other countries,” and to consistently and 
closely consult industries throughout the rulemaking and implementation process.146  
Along with suggesting that controls on emerging technologies should be narrow and 
should avoid hindering innovation, IBM’s comment suggests several policy questions to help 
identify an emerging technology:147  Is the technology really a new and distinctly novel 
technology?148  Is the technology growing and evolving?149  Is the technology widely available, 
and will controls actually help prevent access to the technology?150  Do only a select few have 
the capability to further develop the technology?151  Is it challenging to reverse engineer the 
technology, given the state of knowledge?152  Although these questions are vast, they reaffirm 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
more than $7 trillion in annual revenues.  See id;  see also About Us, BUS. ROUNDTABLE, 
https://www.businessroundtable.org/about-us (last visited Aug. 2, 2019). 
146 BUS. ROUNDTABLE, supra note 145. 
147 IBM Comments to U.S. Department of Commerce on Export Controls for Emerging 
Technologies, IBM: THINK POLICY (Jan. 10, 2019), 
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/policy/technology-export-control/. IBM is a leading business in 
innovation and technology. It offers many brands and services that offer AI technology, cloud 
technology, cyber-security innovations, and various consumer products. See id;  see also About 
IBM, IBM, https://www.ibm.com/ibm/us/en/?lnk=fab (last visited Aug. 2, 2019). 






the difficulty in identifying an emerging technology.153  IBM believes that the fourteen 
categories established in the ANPRM are exceptionally broad.154  “A large majority of the list is 
merely a combination of mature technologies used jointly with commercial and open source 
software from around the world.”155    
C. Addressing National Security 
The ANPRM’s call to identify emerging technologies in the interest of national security 
is not surprising; however, it is inadequate because it fails to provide information of what 
national security means.156  The Department of Homeland Security identified steps for the 
advancement of emerging technologies and national security during its 2018 Analytic Exchange 




155 Id. For example, “Certain forms of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning are widely 
available technologies that have been incorporated into numerous commercial products for 
decades. . . . These products perform speech recognition and natural language processing in an 
open domain environment. AI building blocks, such as these, have been taught in academic 
institutions for decades making them – at a high level – poor candidates for consideration as an 
‘emerging technology.’” Id. 
156 50 U.S.C. § 4817 (2019). 
157 See DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, EMERGING TECHNOLOGY AND NATIONAL SECURITY 1, 3–
4 (July 26, 2018), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2018_AEP_Emerging_Technology_and_Nat
ional_Security.pdf (suggesting the need to “incentivize investors and corporations to consider 
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collaboration, the steps lack collaboration with businesses specifically in identifying national 
security objectives.  Instead, it relies on promising a fostering environment for the development 
of innovation, but essentially asks for a stream of information on emerging technologies.158  
Doing so excludes businesses from affecting what national security means, and therefore, 
effective emerging technology regulation. 
PART FOUR: RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Conduct a New Rulemaking 
Concerns for national security, especially in the context of technology, are not new.  
However, recently, discussions of bolstering national security have happened in the context of it 
being developed in conjunction with the development of emerging technologies.159  Additionally, 
the ANPRM did not separately analyze national security from a business’s perspective.  Because 
of this miniscule jump of understanding, or rather an assumption based on an understanding of 
the meaning of national security, it seems that the ANPRM and other governmental policy 
discussions revolve around the protection of national security in spite of the development 
emerging technologies.160  Businesses may feel an inherent lack of need to comply with 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
national security,” to address “competitive threats” and “share national security concerns,” to 
form “strategic public-private partnerships” with an effort to allocate capital to support national 
security, and to ensure that the U.S. “continuously maintains a competitive advantage on global, 
economic, technological, and geopolitical stages”).  
158 Id. 
159 See supra PART THREE (B), (C). 
160 See Comments of the Semiconductor Industry Association on Advanced Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking regarding Review of Controls for Certain Emerging Technologies, SIA 1, 2–4 (Jan. 
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regulations that are found upon such a loose term, especially if regulation procedures would 
hinder innovation.161  
 The ANPRM vaguely asked for comment on how to identify emerging technologies that 
are important to national security.162  While the BIS should have initially provided a list of 
national security concerns with examples of technologies that could impair U.S. national 
security, instead the phrase national security is left to speculation and imagination.163  Therefore, 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
10, 2019), https://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/BIS-ANPRM-on-
emerging-technology-jan-10.pdf (suggesting that the ANPRM should justify how each identified 
emerging technology is essential to U.S. national security, demonstrating with specificity why a 
unilateral control for an emerging technology is necessary). 
161 See Advancing an Innovation Agenda for America, BUS. ROUNDTABLE, 
https://www.businessroundtable.org/advancing-an-innovation-agenda-for-america (last visited 
on Aug. 18, 2019) (quoting JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie Dimon, chairman of Business 
Rountable, “Securing a prosperous future in the United States depends on business and 
government working together to protect networks, safeguard data and meeting the sophistication 
and relentlessness of our adversaries”). 
162 15 C.F.R. §744 (2019). 
163 For example, it is hard for an objective observer to discern the controls on Huawei and other 
technologies as anything but an impetus to control trade policies or gain a market advantage; 
following that perspective, a technology may fall under the need for regulation, even though it 
may not necessarily need regulation.  See supra PART TWO (E)(1), note 129 and accompanying 
text;  but see supra 123.  Because of this lack of clarity in what national security concerns are, 
businesses and exporters may not be able to identify technologies that would perhaps raise 
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the Commerce Department should conduct another ANPRM and seek comment on what 
businesses think how national security concerns arise in its products and exports.  
The Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS)’s ANPRM also is fundamentally similar to the 
above discussion of the Department of Homeland Security’s steps.  The ANPRM does not 
address specific national security threats that are the reason for the ANPRM.  Rather, it generally 
uses the term national security, almost as a “catch-all” phrase to force regulation of technologies 
that are unknown to the BIS.164  
																																																																																																																																																																																		
national security concerns.  See IBM Comments to U.S. Department of Commerce on Export 
Controls for Emerging Technologies, IBM (Jan. 10, 2019), 
https://www.ibm.com/blogs/policy/technology-export-control/ (suggesting that certain 
technologies that would fall under the fourteen broad categories listed in the ANPRM should not 
be contenders of being emerging technologies for regulation). 
164 The ANPRM notes three general considerations: (i) the development of emerging and 
foundational technologies in foreign countries;  (ii) the effect export controls imposed pursuant 
to this section may have on the development of such technologies in the United States;  and (iii) 
the effectiveness of export controls imposed pursuant to this section on limiting the proliferation 
of emerging and foundational technologies to foreign countries[.] 50 U.S.C. § 4817 (a)(2)(B) 
(2019).  An interpretation of these considerations makes it seem as though the government has 
made the policy of remaining market leaders in innovation as its interest of national security.  
See supra note 118.  Further, the ANPRM fails to address a process ensuring a clear reason for 
the regulation of new emerging technologies.  See Review of Controls for Certain Emerging 
Technologies, 83 Fed. Reg. 58,201 (Nov. 19, 2018) (to be codified at 15 C.F.R. § 744) (2018). 
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 In light of demonstrated concerns over the meaning of national security and its 
implications for businesses and innovation, the Commerce Department should undergo another 
ANPRM, and involve businesses and exporters to define national security in the context of 
emerging technologies.  Counterpoints for such a suggestion is that allowing businesses to be 
aware of national security concerns undermines national security.165  Lots of information would 
be classified; allowing certain business owners to become privy to such information is not 
practical and could undermine national security.166  
A comprehensive analysis of national security as a policy is outside the scope of this 
comment; however, another rulemaking phase to clarify national security would help businesses 
in the identification and regulation of emerging technologies.167  The BIS could explain national 
																																																								
165 See Nathan Busch & Austen Givens, Public-Private Partnerships in Homeland Security: 
Opportunities and Challenges, HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS (2012), 
https://www.hsaj.org/articles/233#ref11 (discussing many challenges that face the “privatization 
of national security functions,” such as the increasing need for transparency, while posing the 
question whether private businesses should be held to the same ethical standards as the public 
sector?). 
166 See id. (“Public-private partnerships can also create proprietary and legal risks for companies. 
What assurances, for example, do firms have that [the] government will protect proprietary or 
sensitive information? The WikiLeaks scandal underlines that classified national security 
information can quickly enter the public domain, damaging the national interest”). 
167 See, e.g., Comments of the Semiconductor Industry Association on Advanced Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking regarding Review of Controls for Certain Emerging Technologies, SIA 1, 
5–6 (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.semiconductors.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/BIS-
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security in three ways, which are consistent with the policies of the Export Control Reform 
Act168: First, the BIS should define national security from a business perspective as being a 
consideration of market leadership and military technological advances.  Market leadership is 
important because the U.S. can stay ahead of other countries or bad actors that may use an 
emerging technology for an unknown future use.169  If the U.S. does not understand or even have 
the technology, then national security may be compromised.170  The BIS could explain this in the 
context of 5G technology.171  Further, military technological advances are a national security 
concern that has long been recognized.172  However, the BIS could provide examples of 
particular military uses of technology, such as unmanned aircrafts,173 which could serve as 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
ANPRM-on-emerging-technology-jan-10.pdf (asserting the need for clarification on what 
essential national security concerns will implicate emerging technologies). 
168 50 U.S.C. §§ 4801–4852 (2018).  
169 See THE WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITES STATES OF AMERICA 
1, 21 (Dec. 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-
2017-0905.pdf (“Private industry owns many of the technologies that the government relies upon 
for critical national security missions. . . . The United States must regain the element of surprise 
and field new technologies at the pace of modern industry”). 
170 See id. 
171 See supra note 93. 
172 See NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITES STATES OF AMERICA, supra note 169. 
173 See Yang Yi, China-made solar-powered unmanned aircraft makes maiden flight, XINHUA 
NET (June 30, 2019), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-07/30/c_138270560.htm 
(describing a Chinese company that made a solar-powered unmanned aircraft, which will be used 
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examples of technologies that foreign militaries are using. U.S. corporations could then identify 
technologies that may raise similar concerns. 
Second, the BIS should declare technologies that could allow or facilitate cyberattacks as 
a national security concern.174  Cyberattacks have persistently compromised national security. 
Already this year, countries and bad actors have carried out countless cyberattacks against U.S. 
companies and the U.S. government.175  Iran developed a network of websites and accounts that 
spread false information about the U.S,176 the Chinese intelligence service used NSA hacking 
tools to gather sensitive information,177 and an unknown, possibly state-sponsored hacker tried to 
spear-phish three U.S. utility companies to gain important data.178  It seems that cyberattacks try 
to either gain sensitive data, or disrupt digital infrastructures.  If the BIS were to declare 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
for disaster relief, reconnaissance, and communication; the company said it would also expand 
the aircraft’s application by making it work with 5G technology). 
174 See supra PART TWO. 
175 Lily Hay Newman, The Biggest Cybersecurity Crises of 2019 So Far, WIRED (July 5, 2019), 
https://www.wired.com/story/biggest-cybersecurity-crises-2019-so-far/. 
176 Significant Cyber Incidents Since 2006, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD., https://csis-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/190523_Significant_Cyber_Events_List.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 2, 2019). 
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178 Sean Lyngaas, A potentially state-sponsored hacking campaign tried to phish U.S. utilities in 
July, researchers say, CYBERSCOOP (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.cyberscoop.com/apt-10-
utilities-phishing-proofpoint/. 
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technologies that could possibly facilitate cyberattacks as a blanket national security concern, 
then companies could better identify related emerging technologies. 
Third, the Commerce Department should elucidate which foreign entities, especially 
Chinese corporations, will possibly pose a national security threat, using the example of 5G 
technology and the placement of Huawei on the entity list.179  The main counterpoint to this is 
that businesses cannot be expected to know that espionage, such as the case with Huawei,180 is 
likely.  However, such an area is precisely where the BIS can provide a list of entities, or even 
specific corporations, which pose as possible security threats, relying on threats that have been 
recently exposed.  Exporters could use this list to then identify possible emerging technologies 
that the Chinese, or any malicious entity, may have access to through their dealings. 
Additionally, similar to CFIUS, the Commerce Department can undertake a pilot 
program to determine the scope of emerging technologies that would implicate national security 
concerns.181  Last year, CFIUS began a pilot program that expanded its jurisdiction and 
immediately made effective certain mandatory requirements.182  Because the program required 
certain businesses to file declarations, CFIUS often did not give clear replies to filings, 
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(Nov. 10, 2018) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 801). 
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commonly called a “shrug.”183  The Commerce Department can borrow the elements of 
mandatory filings and initiate a pilot program that would require certain exporters to file 
declarations and provide information about their technologies. 
 B. Create a New Committee 
The ANPRM calls for an interagency process, considering both public and classified 
information, as well as information from the Emerging Technology Technical Advisory 
Committee and CFIUS.184  This likely means that, since multiple committees are involved, 
information must be consolidated and competing policies must be sorted out.  Similar to the 
inefficiencies created by exports being regulated by multiple agencies, having a multi-
committee, interagency process to identify emerging technologies will make inefficiencies and 
complications inevitable.185  To solve these issues, the Commerce Department should create a 
single agency that specifically handles the tracking of developing technologies. 
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2019, 4:20 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1144251/cfius-2-0-roundup-the-pilot-
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enforcement on how to interpret the pilot program rules). 
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Consolidating the process of identifying emerging technologies should be similar to the 
Obama Administration’s attempt to consolidate the multiple export agencies.186  The Obama 
Administration attempted and sought to create a single control list, a single licensing agency, a 
unified information technology system, and a single enforcement agency.187  It accomplished this 
by moving items under the jurisdiction of another agency into the jurisdiction of the Export 
Administration Regulations (EAR).188  The Trump Administration is also continuing to 
consolidate agencies.  Recently, the BIS issued a proposed rule that would consolidate several 
items on the United States Munitions List (USML), which is a control list of exports intended for 
military use under the State Department, with the EAR’s CCL.189  The consolidated items would 
receive a new ECCN series, and its regulation would be subject to the EAR’s jurisdiction.  
Similar to this consolidation of agency functions, a single committee should develop and gather 
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information about emerging technologies.  That single committee would then provide the 
information to the various controlling agencies, and especially to the Commerce Department. 
Admittedly, an Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) already exists.190  From 
the description of this agency, the OSTP is responsible for providing “the President and others 
within the Executive Office of the President with advice on the scientific, engineering, and 
technological aspects of the economy, national security, homeland security, health, foreign 
relations, the environment, and the technological recovery and use of resources, among other 
topics.”191  However, despite the existence of an agency whose function seemingly relates 
directly to the identification of emerging technologies in the interest of national security, the 
ANPRM calls upon an interagency process, specifying the Emerging Technology Technical 
Advisory Committee and CFIUS.192  At the confluence of these agencies lies the confusion and 
complications.193  Learning from the past attempts of consolidating the entire system of export 
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controls, a single agency with hired technology experts and scientists would streamline the 
identification of emerging technologies.194  This comment recommends that such a function 
should be delegated to the already existing OSTP, or to a newly created committee. 
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In addition to the creation of a single committee to deal with the continuous identification 
of emerging technologies, the EAR could require reports from exporters that acquire an Export 
Control Classification Number (ECCN).  Currently, certain exports are allowed an exception 
from getting a license, but are instead required to file reports.195  Similarly, the EAR could 
require exporters that request ECCNs for CCL items that already exist for technologies to submit 
a report about three things: first, a detailed report about the technology that is being exported and 
its availability in the foreign market; second, a speculative report about what hindrances in 
innovation the company would suffer from various degrees of export controls; and third, a report 
about whether export controls would affect the international proliferation of the technology and 
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to what degree.196  The single committee designated for tracking emerging technologies could 
receive this report, suggesting additions to the CCL as it sees fit.  
CONCLUSION 
 The Department of Commerce must have realistic and clear goals for regulating emerging 
technologies.  The current ANPRM simply stated that the addition of emerging technologies to 
the Commerce Control List is in the interest of national security, but it did not specify or ask how 
such an addition would not hinder innovation in the United States,197 nor did it clarify what 
national security means.  The Commerce Department should issue a separate rulemaking phase 
to identify what the national security interests are—in the context of emerging technologies—
and perhaps create a new committee that works with leading technology companies to 
continuously identify emerging technologies.  These two recommendations, in conjunction with 
initiating a pilot program and innovative controls that require reporting, would help the 
government and businesses solve the emerging technologies and national security conundrum. 
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